Veterinary medicine : Cetartiodactyla

VETERINARY MEDICINE : CETARTIODACTYLA

Hippopotamidae

Hippopotamus

Hippopotamus amphibius :

Bacillus anthracis

^ref

Bacillus anthracis

contamination of grazing, generally as a result of an infected animal carcass leaking infected blood from its orifices onto the pasture.
ingestion of contaminated water, particularly in small stagnant pools that are drying up during dry periods. In this situation, the infection appears to be related to stress, stagnation (no diluting or flushing of spores), and relative overpopulation. Most outbreaks of anthrax in Africa occur during the dry season or dry cycles.
open wound lacerations resulting in per-cutaneous infections. This route of infection may possibly even occur in larger expanses of water, where there is a dilution factor, but is more likely to occur in smaller stagnant pools that have become heavily contaminated.
cannibalism with ingestion of tissues from an infected carcass.

anthrax is endemic in many areas of Africa and the world, and these endemic areas are frequently associated with alkaline soils and alkaline surface water frequently related to volcanic /calcite geological formations. The Queen Elizabeth system fulfills most of these criteria.
in the Bacillus anthracis life cycle, long dormant periods in the environment in the resistant spore survival mode are interspersed with short periods of exponential replication of the germinated bacilli within suitable hosts during outbreaks. Interepidemic periods may be measured in years or decades, and in remote areas of the developing world, the disease may not have been previously recognised or documented.
triggers for these outbreaks include local overabundance of hosts, poor soil drainage and stressors generally associated with resource depletion and intra- and inter-specific competition. Hippos have few natural enemies except man, and there is a cyclical tendency for their population growth to exceed the ecological carrying capacity of their nocturnal grazing range. Dry seasons and dry cycles compound the problem. In the Queen Elizabeth National Park system, Lake Edward and Lake George (linked by the Kazinga channel) are major aquatic features stretching for many square miles, and support a large hippo population. Census figures in 1958 reported a population in excess of 15 000 for the system, with resultant severe overgrazing, trampling and soil erosion. Between 1958 and 1966, more than 7000 hippos were culled to address this overabundance issue. A 1969 census showed that there were still 10 000 hippos in the system. Heavy poaching in the 1970s reduced this population by half, but by the 1990s the population had recovered again to over 7500. I unfortunately have no recent census figures.
anthrax outbreaks may possibly be seen as a natural population-regulating mechanism for some species (including hippos) under certain environmental conditions and relative population density situations. Epidemic outbreaks are relatively short-lived (generally measured in months) and in most species (except buffalo and bison) there appears to be no gender predilection. The male predilection seen in African buffalo and bison appears to be linked to wallowing behaviour. Another observation is that sub-adult animals are relatively under-represented in carcass counts.

contamination of grazing by the leaking of unclotted blood from body orifices of terminal or dead individuals and from scavenged freshly dead carcasses.
contamination of lake shallows and pools and cattle troughs by bathing vultures that have recently fed on infected carcasses.
percutaneous infection of fight wounds by spores in the environment or spores in the oral cavity of the aggressor.
mechanical transmission by large haematophagous biting flies (Pangonia spp.) which target hippos.
cannabalism with ingestion of tissues from infected carcasses.

vaccination of endangered wildlife species that are at risk -- as many as possible -- where possible.
public awareness campaigns stressing the danger of handling or utilising carcasses of dead animals.
reduction of contamination of the environment by burning or [2nd best] burying carcasses. Alternately, making carcasses unattractive to scavengers by spraying with formalin or covering with branches or sheets of plastic until putrefaction, anaerobic conditions, acid pH and temperature destroy the bacilli in the carcass (2- 4 days). About 10 years ago, the Canadians discovered in the MacKenzie Bison Sanctuary that one could prevent carcass scavenging long enough for decomposition to change the pH -- and thereby kill the vegetative organisms -- by spraying carcasses with 5% formaldehyde. This acid pH change takes only a few days (3 to 5 days), after which a carcass can be left to rot and nature with minimal environmental contamination. If the fresh carcass is not opened, minimal or no sporulation occurs. In the case of hippopotami, their aquatic habits frequently result in the carcasses of anthrax victims floating or surrounded by shallow water, making them relatively inaccessible to winged or terrestrial scavengers. Their thick hide is not easily penetrated (even by crocodiles) until putrefaction is fairly advanced. Most bacilli in the carcases will therefore be destroyed by their anaerobic and acidic environment together with the massive growth of putrefactive organisms. Theoretically therefore, floating hippo carcasses should not be a major source of contamination by spores, with the exception of exudates from orifices (when present). Also, in the main bodies of water of large lakes, the dilution factor for spores should be such as to pose minimum risk. However, contamination of small pools and inlets will probably require the removal, beaching and burning or burying of carcasses.

₅₀

Bacillus anthracis

hipposudoric acid

norhipposudoric acid

Pseudomonas aeruginosa

Klebsiella pneumoniae

^ref

Ruminantia ("small ruminants" generally refers to either sheep or goats), Pecora, Bovoidea

Bovidae

Antilocapridae

Antilocapra

Antilocapra americana (pronghorn antelope)

Other nontransmissible diseases

epizootic hemorrhagic disease (EHD)

Bovinae

Bison

Bison bison (American bison)

BSE

Bos

Bos frontalis (gaur) are found in central and southern India, in Nepal & Bhutan, and in SE Asia^ref
Bos grunniens (domestic yak)

Bos indicus (zebu)
Bos primigenius (aurochs)

Bos primigenius indicus (dwarf zebu) : a type of Asiatic ox that has a fleshy hump, floppy ears, a loose dewlap, and is highly resistant to the effects of heat and insect attack

Bos taurus (cows, bovines, cattle) : cattle normally ingest 2-3 (up to 10) kg of soil per day

Taenia saginata

Otobius megnini

Hypoderma bovis

Babesia bovis

Babesia divergens

Dermatophilus congolensis

Bacillus anthracis

bovine anthrax

Epidemiology

champs maudit

Russia : places with any history of anthrax are permanently labelled as 'anthrax sites' :

the Ural Federal region is approximately 1.8 million km² in area, with a human population of about 12.5 million. The region consists of Kurgan, Sverdlovsk, Tumen, Chelyabinsk, Yamalo-Nenetskaya, and Hanti-Mansiyskaya national districts. The entire region (north to south) has a history of anthrax, and therefore the discovery of numerous anthrax sites (at least 2086) should not come as a surprise. At 4 of these sites, cases of animals being infected with anthrax were recorded between 1991 and 2000. In reality, the number of cattle gravesites is much higher, as there may be several such gravesites at any one of these anthrax sites. However, it is hard to say that there are positively identified anthrax spores in these gravesites -- as there have never been such investigations into these sites. The Tobolski gravesite, on the banks of the Irtish river, is peculiar, as it is the result of activity at a nearby factory involved in the production of veterinary prophylactic drugs, including vaccines against anthrax. Unfortunately despite sealing off the toxic waste storage facility with concrete, which provides isolation from the surrounding environment, the factory does not have any resources for the radical disinfection of the waste.
during the decade 1994-2004, none of the 515 anthrax sites in the Vologodskaya oblast has shown disease activity.
Ukraine : from 2000 through 2004, there were 26 bovine anthrax outbreak with some 141 animals affected, 3 sheep/goat outbreaks reported (in these species, un-reporting is the norm) with 13 deaths, 2 equine outbreaks with 7 deaths, and 5 pig outbreaks and only 5 deaths reported. The give-away is that in the same period, there have been 15 human cases reported
Georgia has a severe anthrax problem in its livestock. The diseaseis regularly seen in a number of areas, and the government is struggling to develop an efficient, and effective, veterinary control program. Human cases have been regularly reported since 1995: 33 cases in 1996, 4 cases in 1997, 11 cases in 1998, 51 cases in 1999, 21 cases in 2000, and 26 cases in 2001. This is not the 1st time urban cases in Tblisi have been only the tip of a rural epidemiological anthrax iceberg. Gardabani district is regularly blamed, but it suffers from being close to Tblisi, and, consequently, is reported upon in the press. Some of the 2001 cases were in Abkhazia, Zugdidi district.

Europe

Finland : outbreaks in 1988 and in 2004 (southern Finland)
Italy. Basilicata : this mountainous area normally has 2 to 3 outbreaks each summer. This series of outbreaks has been ascribed to the heavy rains eroding historically contaminated cattle graves and thus depositing spores in the pastures. In 2004 the 1st outbreak was noted in late July 2004 and in retrospect was probably just the usual summer incident. But in late August this epidemic started, and by 24 Sep 2004 totalled some 36 known outbreaks; in this hilly area, there are certainly other cases not observed or not reported. The total recorded cases are 54 cattle, 7 horses, 11 sheep, and 4 red deer. Presumably there have been subsequent outbreaks in the region. 2 veterinarians have developed cutaneous anthrax^ref.
UK : 2 cows died of anthrax on a beef farm in Rhondda Cynon Taff in south Wales on Apr 2006. It is the 1st case in Britain since 2002, when a cow died at a farm in Wrexham, considered to be a sporadic incident on a farm which had 3 anthrax cases in the previous 2 decades. There was also a case in cattle in Clwyd in 1992 and pigs were confirmed

^ref

Africa :

Zambia : in this part of Africa it is not unusual to see a ratio of 10 human cases per bovine case
Zimbabwe : just over 20 years ago it had 10 000 human cases when disease control had been significantly weakened by their civil war. With the ongoing lawlessness and fragile infrastructure, this may become a repeat of those events. The first cases of anthrax at Morgenster in Masvingo were reported in September 2003, and so far Bikita has the highest number, with 147 cases having been reported in Ngorima, Mutikizizi, and Devure. In Gutu district, a total of 82 cases, including 2 deaths, were reported, while in Chivi 51 cases and deaths were reported. It is highly probable that the true incidence of human cases in rural areas is already a multiple of the reported number. In normal circumstances this would have been controlled and prevented from the start by proper livestock vaccination.

Asia :

India : anthrax is not frequent in western India but not unknown. It is most common in the south and through the eastern states. The Indian National Survey for 1989-94 had southern India and Tamil Nadu with the highest incidences for the disease. A companion document for 1991-1996 had it occurring in Tamil Nadu each year in cattle, buffalo, sheep, and goats in sometimes spectacular numbers. In 1996 a paper described some 29 patients with anthrax meningitis with an unfortunately high lethality^ref. A longer version can be found in the Indian Journal of Medical Microbiology^ref, 1996, 14:63-67, with maps showing where cases have been seen in the state, including a spot-map of human and animal cases in the North Arcot Ambedkar district. In 2003 a paper described 27 patients seen at the Christian Medical College & Hospital, Vellore^ref, so I think we can unfortunately assume that the disease continues both in humans and the rural livestock in Tamil Nadu, much as before

USA : the last official update/newsletter was from 28 Jul 2005. The 16 Aug 2005 map has the following numbers of outbreaks in the following 11 South Dakota counties: Brown (4), Day (1), Dewey (7), Hand (2), Hughes (2), Hyde (2), Marshall (3), Potter (7), Spink (2), Sully (9), and Walworth (1), which sum to 39 outbreaks. But the map, for some reason, is titled "2004-2005 Anthrax Cases in South Dakota." It would seem that the cases in northeast South Dakota may be epidemiologically linked to the cases in southeast North Dakota, where the weight of the latter state's outbreaks are. North Dakota Department of Agriculture anthrax map. As of 16 Aug 2005, North Dakota has had 86 cases (premises) in 13 counties. The cattle trails project was to verify the traditional belief that anthrax was related to the cattle trails of the 19th century. If your ranch/farm was in a county within some 10 km of a cattle trail going from the south to the north, there was a significant risk, approx. 10 percent, of historical anthrax in that county. This did not apply to the emigrant trails from east to west. This made sense, as the south-to-north trails, including those from Texas to California, involved longhorn cattle moving from an historic enzootic region of southern Texas and Louisiana. The east-west trails involved less cattle and these were largely British breeds, mainly Herefords, from breeding areas without anthrax. The Red River trails were to get people, goods, and livestock from St. Paul up into northwestern Minnesota and on to southern Manitoba and Winnipeg.
Peru : bovine anthrax is reported annually in and occurs in about 5 out of 10 of the coastal departments. Lately, it has been reported in the following departments: Ancash, Cajamarca, Huanuco, Ica, La Libertad, Lima, Moquegua, and Tumbes.

Burning and then burial of the ashes results in essentially zero risk

Prevention

if possible, carcasses should be burnt. But this can present serious problems when there is a lack of firewood and staff. Hippos and elephants are fuel-hungry species. If all else fails, the best option is to stop scavengers opening up carcasses for the first 3 or 4 days so that the carcass can ferment and the pH drops to acid levels, thereby killing the vegetative cells. Without oxygen they cannot sporulate. In this way the environmental contamination is minimal, even if the carcass is later opened and the bones fed on and dragged around. And even with sites that have spores, repeated sampling over the years has shown some sites becoming 'apathogenic' from plasmid loss. Examination of such sites is needed, if only to rule out those that present no risk. Watery diarrhea is not a normal sign of clinical anthrax, which is normally characterised by peracute death in cattle. Bloody exudates from the various orifices post-mortem, though common in textbooks, in reality is not a consistent feature of livestock anthrax. The US Navy test kit depends on the PA titre in the bloody fluids, and this titre falls off with time such that carcasses over 3 days old can be negative though culture-positive. For fresh cases it is unbeatable.
Carbosap vaccine (2 injections). Normally anthrax is rarely seen in commercial herds in Africa because of the higher level of management practiced and regular vaccinations. If animals are not in good condition when vaccinated, any immunity developed is been minimal. Anthrax is not a contagious disease. Post-outbreak herd quarantine is to stop animals leaving the farm that are incubating the disease and before the vaccine protection has kicked in. With Sterne it is frankly rare to see deaths from anthrax > 8 days after vaccination; normal development of immunity is faster. The most efficient way to control anthrax in cattle herds is (1) to properly and quickly deal with the affected carcasses; (2) to treat the survivors with a long-acting antibiotic (such as LA200, but use normal penicillin with horses, as LA200 is painful); and (3) to wait 7-10 days before vaccinating with Sterne or another recognised live vaccine.
Sterne vaccine : the common experience is that you will get deaths up to 8 days post-vaccination because it is only at that point that protection has been fully developed. And because of that 8-day risk window, ranchers are encouraged to 1st treat their stock with long-acting antibiotics to treat any apparently healthy animals that are incubating an infection. LA200 gives a 3-day cover but cannot be used with lactating dairy cows. Benzathine Penicillin with Penicillin G Procaine gives a 48-hour cover and can be used with dairy cows. Because the latter is shorter acting, it may not be as efficacious and may need to be given twice or in larger doses than specified on the bottle. Anyway, if there have been deaths in a dairy herd, animals' temperatures should be checked morning and afternoon when they come in for milking until the vaccination has taken effect; any animal with a temperature or seeming to be ill (dairymen know their animals) should be taken out of the line and treated. There is no risk to humans from the vaccine when they drink the milk from healthy vaccinated cows. If you use the antibiotics after the vaccine, it can stop the vaccine from developing a full immunity by killing circulating live vaccine organisms. So the best course of action is to 1st treat with antibiotics, wait 7-10 days, and then vaccinate. If you use antibiotics simultaneously with vaccine, you will have to revaccinate the animals 2 weeks later to get any long term protection. Once a herd has had anthrax, you should revaccinate each following spring for at least 3 years because of any pasture contamination. This also applies to ranchers who may not have had any anthrax deaths but whose neighbors have. You cannot count on the latter remembering to revaccinate next year, and when they are reminded by cows dying, it may be too late for you to protect your animals. I have seen this happen more than a few times.
simultaneous treatment with antibiotics and Sterne only results in killing the live vaccine and any incubating infections without any medium-term benefits. The report of human cases from consuming "preserved meat" follows from the need of farm managers -- usually poor relatives of the farm owner -- having to prove that any missing animals had died and had not been sold or given away. Thus animals dying are skinned; the meat is stripped from the carcass and sun-dried; and the head, hide and dried meat are available to the owner when he or she later visits the farm. This handling maximises the number of spores in these products)

Brucella melitensis biovar Abortus

bovine brucellosis

Brucella abortus

the animal which introduced the infection may no longer be alive;
although the disease reached and became established in the herd in Cornwall, it may not have persisted elsewhere.

1) bovine brucellosis or any suspicion thereof is notifiable;
2) the entire cattle population is under official veterinary control and it has been ascertained that the rate of brucellosis infection does not exceed 0.2% of the cattle herds in the country or zone under consideration;
3) the serological tests for bovine brucellosis are periodically conducted in each herd, with or without the ring test;
4) no animal has been vaccinated against bovine brucellosis for at least the past 3 years;
5) all reactors are slaughtered;
6) animals introduced into a free country or zone shall only come from herds officially free from bovine brucellosis or from herds free from bovine brucellosis. This condition may be waived for animals which have not been vaccinated and which, prior to entry into the herd, were isolated and were subjected to the serological tests for bovine brucellosis with negative results on 2 occasions, with an interval of 30 days between each test. These tests are not considered valid in female animals which have calved during the past 14 days. In a country where all herds of cattle have qualified as officially free from bovine brucellosis and where no reactor has been found for the past 5 years, the system for further control may be decided by the country concerned)

Burkholderia pseudomallei

Escherichia coli O157:H7

Prevention

E. coli

Coxiella burnetii

Leptospira interrogans serovar hardjo

Anaplasma phagocytophilum

Chlamydiophila psittaci

Buss disease / sporadic bovine encephalomyelitis

bovine papular stomatitis virus

Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus

Rift Valley fever virus

Wesselsbron virus (WSL)

Wesselsbron disease

rabies virus

foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV)

foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) / aftosa / aphthous fever / hoof-and-mouth disease / contagious or epizootic aphthae / tabak

epizootic aphta / aphthous fever / foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) / illness No.5

Epidemiology

Europe

Great Britain : > 8 millions animals (around 1 in 8 were cows) were slaughtered in 2001 in a desperate effort to control the most serious British epidemic of FMD disease in over 30 years, caused by serotype O. Inactivated vaccine, which had proven to be successful for the eradication of the disease, was ruled out because the blood of dosed and infected animals is indistinguishable (their immune responses are similar) and symptoms can take days to develop : during this delay a healthy-looking animal can spread the FMD virus, so under current European and American laws vaccinated animals cannot be bought or sold due to inability to distinguish vaccinated animals from infected one. The European Commission in 1990-1, after undertaking a cost benefit analysis, implemented a policy of non-vaccination to increase export opportunities and to ensure high animal health standards : this outbreak containment policy requires an export ban on all livestock and animal products from any affected country, along with movement restrictions and the slaughter and burning of all cloven-hoofed animals that are either infected, on infected premises, or in contact with infected animals. Until now the European Union has remained free of FMD since an outbreak in Greece in 1996. At the time, authorities were criticised for their lack of preparedness. Several years on, the government has taken important steps to avert a future outbreak, summarized in a report (alternative URL) by the Royal Society : first, the government has taken steps to prevent the disease entering the country by clamping down on imported meat and animal feed that might harbour the virus. Second, it has made moves to stop a small outbreak escalating into a full-scale epidemic by, for example, making faster diagnoses and introducing measures to freeze movement of infected animals immediately. But on the down side, the panel concludes that the government is not fully prepared to thwart the disease by vaccinating animals. Vaccination was not used in the 2001 British epidemic, partly because it is difficult to tell animals that have been vaccinated from those that have been infected, as both produce a similar immune response. Tests to distinguish vaccinated and infected animals have now become available and vaccination is considered a first line of defence, but the tests have not yet been validated and so are not ready to use. The country also lacks the infrastructure to ensure that vaccines and tests could be deployed on a massive scale, and there is no clear commitment to use it widely. The report urges the government to re-visit its emergency plans every few years to ensure that these remain adequate as farming practices change. The government has already taken steps to identify remaining shortfalls in its foot-and-mouth strategy. Exercise Hornbeam, for example, simulated days 7 and 8 of a disease outbreak in June 2004. There is an urgent need for a vaccine that can prevent the disease from taking root in animals in the first place rather than simply protecting them from the symptoms of the disease

South America : during 2003, FMD was officially reported from 3 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay. Serotype C has been reported in the Brazilian state of Amazonas, in the North of Brazil in 2004 after last detection in 1995 : the Argentine vaccine is bivalent, O and A, tetravalent in serotype, and contains, besides O, the antigens A-24, A-2000, and A-2004, but it does not contain type C. The Reference Lab at the Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright does not show any isolates of Type C after 1996. During this period, most of the outbreaks in South America were either Type A, Type O, or a mixture of both types.
Asia : 2 FMD serotypes are, reportedly, evolving now in eastern Asia/the far east: type Asia 1 in Russia's Amur region (Khabarovsk province); type A in eastern Mongolia's Dornod province. They are > 1000 miles apart; both share borders with the People's Republic of China

between 1990 and 1996, there were 29 reports of type C virus, almost all from Asia. Nepal led the list with 14 isolates, Philippines was next with 8 isolates, and one came from the Soviet Union (1991). The data obviously indicate that Type C has been absent from the world scene for several years now. It is very important to figure out exactly how it came back and to ensure that it is contained on the island in the Amazon. FMD is endemic in Cambodia : according to Cambodia's detailed monthly reports to the OIE, FMD was recorded there during each month of 2003 (20 outbreaks), affecting 3023 cows, 528 buffalo, and 351 pigs in 8 provinces (The cattle population of Cambodia is approximately 2.9 million; buffalo, 0.6 million; and pigs 2.1 million) and the last FMD virus typing of samples from Cambodia was carried out at the World Reference Laboratory (Pirbright, UK) in 2000 (serotype O was identified). FMD is endemic in Pakistan, reportedly caused, during 2003, by 3 serotypes: A, Asia1, and O. FMD has been spreading in Zambia since February 2004.
Russia's concern about the FMD situation in China is understandable in view of the outbreak in dairy cattle, caused by FMD virus serotype O of the pan-Asian group, detected in Amur, 15 km from the Chinese border, in April 2004. China's last OIE-reported outbreak of FMD occurred in May 1999. It was caused by FMD serotype O (most probably of the pan-Asian group). Totally, 8 outbreaks were officially reported: 5 outbreaks from Tibet, 2 from Hainan, and one from Fujian. The disease was reported as absent during 2000-2002^ref. During 2003, 4 China's monthly reports are available on OIE's Handistatus database and cover only the period September - December, and stated that the disease was absent. In 2004, monthly reports cover the period January - August 2004, also stating absence of the disease. No later reports are available. An OIE experts mission visited China during 10-19 May 2004. According to the Mission's 20-page report (which was available on OIE's web-site until very recently), 6 Reference Laboratories for the following List A diseases were visited and reviewed: classical swine fever (CSF), rinderpest, avian influenza (AI), contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP), Newcastle disease (ND) and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Hopefully, FMD will be covered in future visits. In 2004 Russia suffered an outbreak of FMD, serotype O, in dairy cattle in the Amur region, 15 km from the Chinese border. Subsequently (in September 2004), Russia restricted imports from China. The 2 official reports of Russia to the OIE on the 2004 outbreak mentioned a total number of 141 dairy cows (12 months old) exposed to the virus, which was identified as serotype O of the pan-Asian group. 87 of them were clinically affected; 890 animals -- including in-contact animals -- were destroyed. The current media-derived data concerning 2004's outbreak are somewhat different, particularly in regard to the alleged involvement of pigs. Clarifications will help. As to the current outbreak, caused by a different serotype (Asia 1), here also there are discrepancies between official and unofficial data, particularly regarding the numbers of affected animals. The 2 affected bovines mentioned in the official notification might reflect the number of sampled animals tested in the laboratory. It will be helpful to obtain the number of exposed and clinically affected animals, and to exclude -- or otherwise -- the possibility that pigs are involved as well. The event in Busse, Svobodnenskiy, Amur region (Amurskaya oblast) (20 km from the closest village in the Russian territory and 300 m from the border with the People's Republic of China) started on 6 Jun 2005 and involved 2 cases. The Asia 1 epizootic in Russia's far east seems to continue its pace; a look at the map will reveal that this is not necessarily a spread within Russian territory, but more probably repeated introductions from neighboring China. Busse, where the 1st outbreak was reported in June 2005, is situated on the Amur river, which separates Russia from China. The 3 villages in the Khabarovsk region, found infected in August 2005, are situated on the Ussuri river, also separating Russia from China. This area is more than 1000 km distant (southeast) from Busse. The new outbreak, reported on 26 Aug 2005 in the Primorskiy region, also borders China, about 700 km south of the foci in Khabarovsk. According to an analysis by the FAO (June 2005, following the Amur outbreak), countries bordering China to the south and east could be considered at risk of Asia 1 on a geographical basis. Indeed, outbreaks have been recorded in Mongolia and Myanmar. Unless drastic and efficient control activities are immediately applied in China, additional introductions of the virus to other countries might be expected along her borders. The further spread, observed since June 2005, prescribes the need for increased alertness in the region, including consideration of the need to apply mass vaccinations against serotype Asia 1.
Pakistan : FMD is endemic; the efficient way to help the farmers reduce their losses is a preventive, not a curative one. Pakistan's last available annual report to the OIE, for 2003, does not include data on vaccinations. In 2002, 13 690 bovines and 28 765 buffalo were reportedly vaccinated; the national herd included 22.8 million bovines and 24 million buffalo. During 2004, 8 samples were sent from Pakistan to the OIE/FAO World Reference Laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease at Pirbright, UK. 2 of them were found positive for FMDV (serotype Asia 1). During 2003, 81 samples were sent, of which 29 were found positive for FMDV serotype O, 8 serotype A and 4 serotype Asia 1. In 2 samples, mixed infections, including serotypes O and A, were demonstrated
China : according to China's reports to the OIE, not a single outbreak of FMD was recorded there between May 1999 and the end of 2004. Since 13 May 2005 to 13 July 2006, China has sent the OIE 14 official notifications on FMD in bovines, caused by FMD virus serotype Asia 1, in the following 9 provinces (in chronological order of their 1st recordings): Jiangsu, Beijing, Hebei, Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai, Shandong, Ningxia and Jiangxi. During 2005, the Chinese veterinary services sent the OIE 6 reports on FMD, serotype Asia 1, causing 10 outbreaks in 4 (out of China's 22) provinces, 1 out of China's 5 autonomous regions and 1 out of China's 4 major municipalities. The affected provinces were (in brackets, number of outbreaks): Shandong (2), Gansu (1), Qinghai (1), Hebei (2), Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (2), Beijing municipality (1), and Jiangsu (1). They spread over distances of about 4000 km, from the far eastern parts of China (Jiangsu, Shandong, Hebei and Beijing) to the centre (Gansu), midwest (Qinghai) and the far north west (Xinjiang autonomous region), as follows:

1. 13 May 2005 / bov / Jiangsu province (east)
2. 13 May 2005 / bov / Shandong province (east)
3. 26 May 2005 / bov / Xinjiang (autonomous region, north-west)
4. 26 May 2005 / bov / Hebei province (east)
5. 26 May 2005 / bov / Beijing municipality (east)
6. 20 Jun 2005 / bov / Xinjiang (autonomous region, north-west)
7. 27 Jun 2005 / bov / Hebei (east)
8. 20 Jul 2005 / bov / Qinghai (mid-west)
9. 20 Jul 2005 / bov / Gansu (centre/mid-west)

^ref

Cambodia : in 2000, when serotype O was identified. An outbreak in pigs occurred in 2005
Peninsular Malaysia reported 39 outbreaks in 1996, 39 in 1997, 10 in 1998, 9 in 1999, 3 in 2000, 189 in 2001, 39 in 2002 (incomplete outbreak number but some 5760 individuals were affected), 21 in 2003, 37 in 2004, and only 1 in 2005
Kyrgyzstan (officially, Kyrgyz Republic; 2005 est. pop. 5 146 000; c. 76 600 sq mi or 198 400 sq km), borders China in the southeast, Kazakhstan in the north, Uzbekistan in the west, and Tajikistan in the southwest^ref. The 2005 numbers of FMD-susceptible species, according to FAO statistics, are the following: cattle 1 034 890, sheep 2 965 220, goats 808 397, pigs 82 659. FMD outbreaks were last reported from Kyrgyzstan by ProMED-mail in January 2004. However, according to Kyrgyzstan's official reports to the OIE (their last available report covered 2004), no outbreaks were officially recorded after Feb 2001, when 2 outbreaks were reported in Naryn and one in Issyk-Koul. They were reportedly caused by FMD virus serotype O^ref
Recent serotyping of samples sent from Southeast Asian countries to Pirbright reveals the presence of serotypes O (Viet Nam, Myanmar, Hong Kong and Thailand), A (Thailand) and Asia 1 (Hong Kong). The spread of serotype Asia 1 throughout China has been recently reported, with one penetration into Russia (Amur).
Turkey : since 21 Jan 2006 outbreak due to virus type A was reported in the village of Nadirli (Babaeski, province of Kirklareli), in Thrace region. According to the OIE, the last reported outbreak was in 2001; FMD serotypes A and O are endemic in Turkey, excluding Thrace, which has been free for years. An FMD outbreak occurred in Georgia in 2002. An extensive outbreak of FMD occurred in the region in 1996 affecting Bulgaria, Albania and several parts of the former Yugoslavia^ref

Africa

Zambia : according to current OIE's epidemiological statistics, FMD types SAT1, SAT2, and SAT3 have been officially reported from northern province in each of the months Feb-Jun 2004. FMD type SAT1 was reported during July in the central province and in Sep 2004 in an unspecified area^ref. Final data for 2004 and an update for the 1st semester of 2005, from all member countries including Zambia, might be expected during the current General Session of the OIE in Paris (22-27 May 2005). Dipping cattle has no impact upon the control of FMD; however, it is an important measure for the control of corridor disease.
Botswana : according to 2003 report, following the 2002/2003 FMD outbreaks, 358 088 head of cattle were vaccinated -- all within the "vaccination zone". The vaccine is produced by the Botswana Vaccine Institute, which is OIE's Regional Reference Laboratory for FMD, Africa. A National Animal Health Status Report for 2004, submitted by Botswana for the 16th Conference of the OIE Regional Commission for Africa in Khartoum (Sudan), 7-10 Feb 2005, included the following FMD-related data pertaining to the recent epidemiological situation: "FMDV in Botswana is restricted to the northern part of the country where the 3 South African Territory serotypes (SAT I, II and III) are maintained within the African Buffalo (Syncerus caffer) populations. Before the 2002/2003 outbreaks, Botswana had been free from FMD for over 21 years. FMD control in Botswana is based on vaccination of cattle and movement control of cloven-hoofed animals and animal products. To that end, a system of zoning using disease control cordon fences has been employed. The 2002/2003 FMD outbreaks were successfully controlled through stamping out. Currently The World Animal Health Organisation (OIE) recognizes Botswana as having zonal freedom from FMD without vaccination".^ref

New Zealand : a letter claimed a release on Waiheke Island (39 farmers) on 9 May and threatening a further release unless the government responded to demands for taxation changes, and paid a large sum of money. The New Zealand police are investigating the attempted extortion and are treating the letter as a hoax^ref1,
ref2. All stock will be checked every 48 hours for 14 days -- the longest possible incubation period for FMD before clinical symptoms appear. Pigs are by far the greatest risk of spread, but there are few pigs on Waiheke Island. Cattle and sheep are a much lower risk -- there are some 2500 cattle and 18 000 sheep on the island. FMD is an unwanted organism under the Biosecurity Act of 1993. Anyone convicted of spreading it faces a penalty of up to 5 years' imprisonment or a fine up to $100 000 [USD 73 000]. Under the Crimes Act anyone convicted of threatening to commit a crime that would cause major damage to the economy can be sentenced to 7 years in jail. Section 298A stipulates that anyone causing disease or sickness to animals can be sentenced to up to 10 years in jail. A 2nd letter, received 16 May 2005 by Wellington's Dominion Post newspaper, has stated that the claims made last week are a hoax and that no FMDV was released in New Zealand. As a result of this additional information and the surveillance results thus far, MAF now intends to remove the legal restrictions covering the movement of animals and risk goods off Waiheke Island by 5 p.m. on Tue 17 May 2005. MAF will, however, continue with a low level of monitoring of livestock on the island until 23 May 2005

early to mid-1960s outbreak of FMD a few miles from the Animal Virus Research Institute at Pirbright, UK, in a ?dairy herd, when the former was doing experiments on birds possibly transmitting virus and the infected animals were in a loose box (stable) one side of an open courtyard, and target animals on the opposite side
the other was from an offshore Danish FMD research institute that affected a herd some kilometers away in Norway, about the same time. Present institutional construction has dealt with any such risks today.

Laboratory examinations

^ref

These tests

Prognosis

Prevention

^ref

IFN-a

^ref

Web resources

World Reference Laboratory for FMD (WRLFMD)

Vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV)

milk

Mycobacterium bovis : 15.8% of cattle in Devon, UK has been hit by an outbreak of bovine tuberculosis (BTB), with 537 new outbreaks in 2003, more than 5 years into the Krebs culling trials of badgers, which are seen as the main carrier of the disease. Eradication of bovine TB reduces disease and death from tuberculosis among farmers and people in contact with infected cattle, or who drink unpasteurized milk. Bovine TB had spread to deer, yellow-necked mouse, wood mouse, shrew, polecat, muntjac and stoat^ref.

pearl disease : bovine tuberculosis of the peritoneum and mesentery in which the tubercles are calcified and pearllike

Mycobacterium avium subsp. paratuberculosis (Johne's disease / chronic dysentery of cattle / paratuberculosis : a usually fatal form of chronic distal enteritis or proctitis , affecting chiefly cattle but also ruminants (including Oryctolagus cuniculus, Ovis aries, Lama pacos and Capra hircus) and other animals. It remotely resembles a tuberculous infection, and is marked by lymphangitis or mesenteric lymphadenitis, intermittent or persistent diarrhea, progressive emaciation, anemia, and extreme weakness. MAP can live undetected in cattle for years. Infected cows secrete the bacteria into their milk and on to their pastures)
cowpox virus
pseudocowpox virus / paravaccinia virus / milker's nodule virus (MNV)
Russian Spring-Summer encephalitis virus (RRSEV)
the 2002 NAHM's Dairy Survey indicated that 87.2% of dairy farms in the United States feed waste milk to their neonatal calves. Although cost-effective, this practice can lead to increased calf morbidity and mortality due to ingestion of pathogenic agents. In an effort to reduce the risk of infection, dairy producers are implementing on-farm pasteurization of the waste milk as a control procedure before feeding the milk to calves. In the present study, the efficacy of a commercial high-temperature, short-time (HTST) on-farm pasteurizer unit to destroy MAP, Salmonella enterica spp., and Mycoplasma spp. in raw milk was evaluated. Replicate experiments were run for 3 isolates of M. paratuberculosis, 3 serovars of Salmonella (derby, dublin, typhimurium); and 4 species of Mycoplasma (bovis, californicum, canadense, serogroup 7) at 2 different levels of experimental inoculation. In addition, HTST pasteurization experiments were performed on colostrum experimentally inoculated with MAP. After culture of the pasteurized milk samples, no viable MAP, Salmonella, or Mycoplasma were recovered, regardless of species, strain, or isolate. Pasteurization of colostrum was also effective in the destruction of MAP but resulted in an average 25% reduction in colostral immunoglobulin. These results suggest that HTST pasteurization is effective in generating a safer product to feed to young calves^ref.

CNS :

PrP^Sc => bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) / mad-cow disease is a TSE . The first clinical case occurred to cow 142 from Pitsham Farm in Sussex on December 22, 1984 but the existence of a new disease was first confirmed microscopically in November 1986. It was not, however, until June 1987 that the Consultant Pathology Unit at the Central Veterinary Laboratory, Weybridge, UK, confirmed this as a case of BSE. However, the BSE inquiry ("Lord Phillips Report", October 2000) further remarked that Epidemiological evidence given to the Inquiry suggests that it is likely that the first cases of BSE probably originated early in the 1970s - possibly a single cow or other animal that developed the disease as a consequence of a gene mutation

Transmission

infection is acquired by some animals between age 3 and 5 by eating ruminant-derived processed animal proteins (PAPs) including meat and bone meal (MBM) : 2.5-6 years of incubation => circling. At least 3 oral challenge trials are being performed in various countries^ref1,
ref2 :

in DEFRA's research project SE1736 (1998-2004), groups of calves were challenged orally with either 100g or 1g of BSE infected bovine CNS of known infectious titre. Tissues and fluids were also produced from age matched controls kept under similar husbandry conditions. In the 100g challenge group, a wide range of tissue and fluid samples were collected at 3 month intervals from 30 months post-challenge. In the 1g challenge group, a wide range of tissues and fluids were collected at approximately 6 month intervals from 36 months post-challenge. The tissues and fluids from these animals have been collected following strict protocols and are archived under ISO9001 conditions. The TSE archive of the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) represents a valuable resource of bovine BSE materials, which is used within the UK program and may be supplied to those engaged elsewhere in BSE research, particularly, but not exclusively, for the development of diagnostic tests. As this is a limited and valuable long term resource, the approval of requests, and release of material, is through an independent archive advisory group (IAAG) made up of scientists with TSE research experience. IAAG consists of 6 researchers from the UK, France and Germany and provides an external review to ensure all requests are dealt with fairly. Officials from Defra, the Food Standards Agency and the European Commission oversee the group
another trial is led by a special BSE infection unit of the Institute of Novel and Emerging Infective Agents (INNT) at the Federal Research Centre for Virus Diseases of Animals (BFAV) on the Island of Riems (a tiny island in the Baltic sea). In this study, begun in early 2003, 56 calves were orally challenged (100g brain stem homogenate each, 1st group (28 animals) in Jan 2003, 2nd group (28 animals brought to the Island of Riems after 6 weeks and quarantined for further 4 weeks) in May 2003). Another 18 calves serve as controls. Blood (serum, plasma etc.), CSF, and urine samples regularly (2 to 4 samples per month) are collected, and selected animals are serially killed and autopsied. From each animal, a panel of more than 120 tissue and bodily fluid samples are taken and preserved in a number of ways (frozen, snap-frozen, formalin-fixed etc.). All samples are taken under BSE-sterile conditions. Samples considered to be important in terms of BSE pathogenesis, and consumer safety, are used in a bioassay experiment utilizing bovine PrP^C over-expressing transgenic mice, which are lacking a species barrier for cattle BSE infectivity. British scientists have supported this infection trial in providing > 5 kg brain tissue from BSE cattle. The study aims to research the course of infection from the start of the infection until the outbreak of the disease. During the 1st year of this trial, 9 out of the 56 challenged calves have been sacrificed and 38 000 specimens collected^ref. As of May 2004, > 60 000 samples have been collected from the animals of the German BSE pathogenesis study, and > 200 000 samples will have been taken by the end of the experiment in the year 2007^ref. > 4000 samples have already been distributed to German TSE research groups and commercial test developers. This experiment is a German initiative within the framework of the German TSE research platform. The distribution of the samples is regulated by the TSE-platform's advisory board, which is composed of elected members -- German TSE researchers -- as well as the heads of the German CJD and BSE archives.
tallow-based calf milk-replacer (CMR) associated with the allowable levels of impurities in tallow^ref. Interestingly, EU's Scientific Steering Committee has not classified cattle tallow derivatives as "not infectious"

Feeding of ruminant derived protein to ruminant animals has been forbidden in UK in July 1988 (in Canada in 1997): PAPs are better detected with immunoassays than with PCR.

transplacental transmission may occur
10-fold concentrated urinary proteins from scrapie-infected mice with lymphocytic nephritis induced scrapie upon inoculation into 50% of noninfected indicator mice. Prionuria was found in presymptomatic scrapie-infected and in sick mice, whereas neither prionuria nor urinary PrPSc was detectable in prion-infected wild-type or PrPC-overexpressing mice, or in nephritic mice inoculated with noninfectious brain. Thus, urine may provide a vector for horizontal prion transmission, and inflammation of excretory organs may influence prion spread The research may explain how animals such as sheep, elk and deer transmit prion diseases. In the USA, a chronic wasting disease is spreading like wildfire among elk and deer. About 20% of the wild deer in some parts of Colorado are infected, and yet these animals are herbivores. Nobody understands what controls the spread : dust mites have been suggested as one method of transmission. Animals may be eating urine-contaminated grass. An explanation that involves urine has difficulties however : the concentration of prions found in the mouse urine in the experiment was 10,000 times lower than in the lymphatic organs, and a million times less than in the brains, the original site of infection. The risk of getting sick by touching or ingesting infected urine is minuscule. Quite apart from the low concentration of prions in urine, it would take a higher dose of the proteins to cause infection this way than through injection into the brain. As yet, there are no data on the risk that might be attached to contact with urine from vCJD patients. On the other hand, nobody wants human prions in the hospital laundry^ref

Surveys conducted by USDA place the number of downer cattle (those that have trouble walking to the slaughterhouse under their own power) at between 150 000 and 200 000 animals annually. Downer cows does not mean diseased cows. It means the animal cannot get up, because of a torn tendon, perhaps from a rough trailer ride, or a broken bone from a slippery floor. There are reasons that animals can fall, and can be injured. It does not mean they have a neurological disease. Other reasons for "downer cattle" include having a large calf, which can injure the obturator nerve as the calf squeezes through the birth canal. Though neurological disease is not a factor in the ratio of the size of the calf vs that of the birthing canal, a downer cow is the result. This is not brain-related neurological disease any more than if a severed spinal cord on an athlete resulted from a throw from his polo pony. Whatever the reason the animal is down, this status now means this animal will not be allowed into the human food chain. Those downers will still be used for pet food and other products, including tallow and cosmetic ingredients [There certainly is nothing more than speculation at the moment as to what the downed animals may go for. However, these cows are not likely to be used for pet food. The final rules are not yet complete, but many of the pet food manufacturers do not want downer animals, because they want to be assured of the safety of the pet food, and because some indigent people consume pet food.]. Affected animals will no longer be going to slaughterhouses but instead most likely most of them will be euthanized and sent to rendering plants, whose products fall within 2 major categories :

proteins

meat meal is seldom produced as per definition anymore, but when used was in pet food as applicable.
meat and bone meal (MBM) can generally be made from raw material of all livestock species. Obviously with the current feed rule, if the product contains raw materials originating from ruminants, it cannot be fed to cattle or other ruminants. MBM could be made from pure bovine, porcine tissues, etc. and traded as such. This may include blood meal, spray-dried animal blood, poultry meal, poultry byproduct meal, poultry hatchery byproducts, and blood protein. MBM is allowed to be in pet food. However, the pet food industry does not want downer animals in its products, and is actively working to institute a similar ban.

fats : tallow, lard, gelatin, greases (yellow and white), fatty acids, glycerine, etc. can be used in the human food chain. So the key for use of rendered products in the human food chain (lard, tallow, gelatin) must be inspection by the Food Safety nspection Service (FSIS). They are products that have scientifically been shown not to harbor prions.
fish meal and bakery byproduct meals (those damaged packages of Twinkies, potato chips, corn chips, and other similar products that are crushed and recooked to make a pleasant grain-based product that may be fed to some pets). Their uses include livestock and poultry feeds; pet foods; industrial uses such as lubricants, paints, ipsticks, gums, glues, etc. None of the bakery by-products goes into the human food chain. Blood meal has not been shown to process the prion agent. However, it is used by gardeners.

Specified risk materials / specified bovine offals (SBO) whose use in the human food supply and advanced meat recovery (AMR) (an industrial technology developed a decade ago that uses hydraulic pressure to force extra pounds muscle tissue from the bone of cow carcasses, without incorporating bone material when operated properly, producing filler for processed foods like hamburger, hot dogs, and pizza toppings. Consumer groups initially complained that bone was getting into the advanced meat recovery product and argued that the product should not be labeled as beef. Then, in 1997, federal agriculture officials announced that they had found spinal cord tissue in some of the meat) is prohibited by USDA include skull, brain, trigeminal ganglia, eyes, vertebral column, spinal cord, and dorsal root ganglia (DRT) of cattle over 30 months of age, and tonsils and small intestine of cattle of all ages. The 1997 ruminant-to-ruminant feeding ban was changed in Dec 2003 to a mammalian-to-ruminant feeding ban, which means that no mammalian tissue can be processed and fed to ruminant animals (cattle, goats, and sheep). The use of these animals as feed for birds, specifically commercial poultry (chickens and turkeys) has caused some concern. Poultry litter is often fed back to cattle, and the concern is that any prion may pass through the litter and be transmitted to the ruminant animal. There is little concern that birds are susceptible to prion agents : although genetically modified chickens have been made to produce the disease under experimental conditions, it is not found naturally. Likewise, the issue of fish being susceptible to prion disease has not been proven in the natural setting, and is again of little concern. One must understand that feed manufactures and renderers are not the same. Renderers produce a starting material that is delivered to the feed manufactures. Feed manufactures include a variety of livestock feed manufacturers as well as pet food manufacturers. Meat and bone meal is still an acceptable product to be fed to companion animals. To ensure that portions of the brain are not dislocated into the tissues of the carcass as a consequence of humanely stunning cattle during the slaughter process, FSIS is issuing a regulation to ban the practice of air-injection stunning. USDA will prohibit use of mechanically separated meat in human food. In June 2006 cattle tissue may have contaminated 2 feed ingredients given to dairy cows -- Pro-Lak and Pro-Amino II -- made by H.J. Baker between August 2005 and June 2006. The 3rd of the recalled ingredients, Pro-Pak with Porcine Meat and Bone, was mislabeled. It is used in poultry feed^ref.

The methodology by which the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of countries is assessed was developed by the Scientific Steering Committee (SSC) of the EU as a qualitative indicator for the likelihood of BSE being present in the relevant countries, basically trying to answer 2 questions:

is there a risk that the BSE-agent was imported into the country under consideration ("external challenge")?
if the BSE-agent was introduced into a country, would it have been recycled and amplified ("unstable" situation) or was the BSE/cattle system of that country able to eliminate the agent ("stable" situation)?

The GBR of 66 countries has already been evaluated by the SSC and its

successor, EFSA's GBR working group. Currently, the 4 categories ("levels"), pertaining to the "Presence of one or more cattle clinically or pre-clinically infected with BSE agent in geographical region/country", include the following countries:

level I (highly unlikely) : Argentina, Australia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Iceland, Namibia, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Singapore, Swaziland, Uruguay, Vanuatu
level II (unlikely but not excluded) : Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden
level III (likely but not confirmed or confirmed, at a lower level) : Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland (Eire), Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (FYR), Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, USA
level 4 (confirmed, at a higher level) : Portugal, UK

The reclassifications of Canada and the USA, from GBR category II ("unlikely but not excluded") to category III ("presence of BSE likely but not confirmed, or confirmed at a lower level"), were inevitable since the detection of their 1st BSE cases. Norway's reclassification from "highly unlikely" to "unlikely but not excluded" means its exporters will have to remove more of the "significant risk material (SRM)" before shipping beef into the EU. GBR re-assessments of Botswana, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Namibia, Panama and Swaziland, presently classified in level I, are expected before the end of 2004.

These 23 countries reported > 184 000 indigenous cases since 1987 to 7 Dec 2004 :

UK is classified in the highest (GBR IV) EU risk category group. > 95% of BSE cases were detected before 2000 : incidence peak occurred in 1992 (37 000, 700 new cases per week) and is currently declining by some 40% year-on-year : 184 138 cows have died from BSE since 1987 (1443 (270.56 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2000, 1202 (232.76 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2001, 1144 in 2002 (445 clinical cases and 594 cases detected by tests; 228.24 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 611 (122.44 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2003, 343 (67.796 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2004, 151 in 2005. There are estimated to have been 4 million BSE infected cows compared with 184 131 officially reported cases
Portugal is classified in the highest (GBR IV) EU risk category group : 949 cases since 1987 (186.95 indigenous cases per million bovines aged over 24 months; 110 cases (137.88 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2001; 86 (107.80 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2002; 133 (137.19 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2003; 91 in 2004 (93.870 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 13 at 22 Apr 2005)
Ireland : 1470 cases since 1987 (38.17 per million bovines aged over 24 months in 2000 (annual incidence rate in cases detected by the active surveillance programme = 17.93; annual incidence rate in BSE clinical cases = 35.356, 246 (61.80 per million bovines aged over 24 months; annual incidence rate in cases detected by the active surveillance programme = 29.90; annual incidence rate in BSE clinical cases = 30.90) in 2001; 333 (88.39 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2002; 183 (57.81 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2003, 117 (43.327 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2004, 23 at 22 Apr 2005). According to official Irish statistics, the percentage of cases diagnosed in animals less than 6 years of age has declined from 40% in 2000 to 16% in 2001, 2% in 2002, and 0% in 2003.
Spain : 532 cases since 1987 ((0.59 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 82 in 2001 (24.23 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 127 in 2002 (37.95 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 167 in 2003 (46.31 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 137 in 2004 (38.945 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 12 at 22 Apr 2005). It is the only European country not showing, in 2003, a decline in the number of diagnosed cases
Switzerland : 456 cases since November 1990 ((40.6 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 42 (49.1 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2001; 24 (27.93 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2002; 21 (24.86 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2003; 3 (including a case in a zoo zebu) in 2004 (3.750 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 0 at 22 Apr 2005). Switzerland reported in November 1990 the first BSE case on the European mainland which could not be attributed to an animal imported from Great Britain. According to the official Swiss data, the infection was presumably due to feed constituents that had been inadequately heated; material which originated from Britain was most probably given new origin labelling and then imported via an indirect route, as according to the Swiss foreign trade statistics, only very small quantities of meat-and-bone meal were imported directly from Great Britain. Switzerland was the first country to introduce active monitoring of BSE, in 1999; the Swiss prionic BSE test is used for the systematic testing of groups of cows at risk. The annual BSE incidence rate (number of indigenous cases per million bovines aged over 24 months) during the years 1999-2003 was 58.7, 40.6, 49.1, 27.93, and 24.86, respectively
Belgium : 127 cases since 1987 (5.53 per million bovines aged over 24 months in 2000; 46 (28.22 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2001, 38 (25.75 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2002, 15 (10.54 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2003, 11 (7.882 per million bovines aged over 24 months) in 2004, 1 at 22 Apr 2005)
France : 946 cases since 1991 (14.73 per million bovines aged over 24 months in 2000 (annual incidence rate in animals euthanised or found dead = 5.45; annual incidence rate in BSE clinical cases = 9.27;); 274 in 2001 (19.70 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 239 in 2002 (20.96 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 137 in 2003 (12.01 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 54 in 2004 (4.736 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 15 at 22 Apr 2005). > 301 200 cattle in France may have been infected with BSE since the disease first appeared in the 1980s to June 2000, based on the amount of meat and bone meal (MBM) from the United Kingdom used in France during the 1980s (46 000 tons between 1986 and 1990), and the fact that most cattle are infected with the disease between the ages of 6 to 12 months. There is uncertainty about estimates of the number of cases in the early 1980s, but the level of animals infected climbed between 1987 and 1990 and dropped from then until 1992. Furthermore, 47 300 animals at an advanced stage of the disease entered into the food chain before 1996, and 1500 between July 1996 and June 2000. According to previous official figures there were just 103 confirmed cases of the disease between 1991 and 2000, during which period the government relied on farmers and veterinarians to report animals with BSE. Since 2000, when controls were tightened, a further 820 cases have been confirmed, according to figures published last month, bringing the total to 923 over the past 13 years. The majority of beef cattle in France are slaughtered before 24 months of age. The infected animals would have been killed before the disease could have shown itself, because of BSE's long incubation period. In 1989, France banned the use of meat and bone meal in cattle feed. The law was modified only in June 1996 (almost 7 years after Britain) and 2000 to ban it from being fed to all ruminant feeds. Just 4 years ago, as France ignored a European Union ruling that British beef was safe again, infected cattle were still entering the food chain. The discovery of an apparent link between BSE and its human equivalent, vCJD, was made in 1996 and led to a worldwide ban on British beef. The ban was lifted by the EU 1999 but illegally maintained by France until 2002. Yet it was not until 2001 that France introduced compulsory tests for BSE in cows, older than 24 months, sent for slaughter^ref.
Slovakia : 20 cases (5 in 2001 (18.34 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 6 in 2002 (18.73 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 2 in 2003 (6.74 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 7 in 2004 (24.635 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 0 at 22 Apr 2005)
Czech Republic : 15 cases since 1987 (2 in 2001 (2.85 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 2 in 2002 (2.50 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 4 in 2003 (5.78 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 7 in 2004 (10.234 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 3 at 22 Apr 2005)
Slovenia : 5 cases since 1987 (1 in 2001 (4.34 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 1 in 2002 (4.44 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 1 in 2003 (4.39 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 2 (including an animal born in Germany) in 2004 (4.585 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 0 at 22 Apr 2005)
Germany : 362 cases since 2000 (1.07 per million bovines aged over 24 months in 2000; 125 in 2001 (19.97 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 106 in 2002 (17.02 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 54 in 2003 (8.71 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 64 in 2004, 15 at 22 Apr 2005; the number of BSE-positive cases detected in Germany since 2001, according to their respective years of birth, is as follows: 2 in 1992; 3 in 1993; 13 in 1994; 80 in 1995; 123 in 1996; 29 in 1997; 18 in 1998; 13 in 1999; 0 in 2000). The 1st case of BSE in native cattle is reported from Germany in 2000. However, according to EU's Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) opinion, exported German cattle could have been contaminated since 1988
Greece : 1 only case since 1987 in 2001 (3.3 per million bovines aged over 24 months)
Liechtenstein : 2 cases between 1987 and 2000
Luxembourg : 2 cases since 1987 (1 in 2002) (14.54 per million bovines aged over 24 months)
Austria : 2 case since 1987 in December 2001 (in Lower Austria federal province) and in 2005. In the latter case an 11 year old cow from a small farm with 8 cattle and 2 pigs located in Riezlern, Bregenz district, Vorarlberg federal province, in the western part of the country, near the German border. The farm is not a member of a breeding association; there was never any purchase of animals. No live animals have ever been sold; all cattle to be slaughtered were taken directly to the slaughterhouse. The affected cow had ear tag number AT 138 752 583. It was born on 31 Mar 1994 at the farm and was found dead on 26 May 2005. The most recently born offspring of the affected cow (calf AT 583 539 672, born on 24 Jan 2005) was slaughtered on 26 Apr 2005. 2 offspring of the affected cow were still on the farm when the farm was quarantined (cow AT 777 654 242, born in 2002, and female calf AT 079 944 747, born in 2003, on pasture). Feed: concentrated feed, whole meal, beet. Since 2002, controls of feeding stuff providers are carried out every year in spring on the occasion of farm audits. The feeding ban was met completely. Before 1995, concentrated feed was imported from Germany. The affected cow was well-fed and delivered about 9 litres of milk per day. During the period prior to its death it showed movement disorders, with no improvement after hoof trimming. The head was held in a low position but there were no disturbances in excretion or behaviour. The owner ascribed the movement disorders to the age of the cow and did not consult a veterinarian. The Austrian Federal Ministry of Health and Women was informed of the suspicion of BSE by the German Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture on 17 Jun 2005. The affected cow had been delivered to a rendering plant in Germany. Samples for BSE testing were taken in Germany. Due to the fact that the 1st rapid test was positive, the sample was sent to the German National Reference Laboratory in the isle of Riems on 16 Jun 2005. A rapid test made at Bavarian Department for Health and Food Safety (Bayerisches Landesamt fuer Gesundheit und Lebensmittelsicherheit, Dienststelle Oberschleissheim), Oberschleissheim, Germany, on 15 Jun 2005 was positive (twice). Immunohistochemistry made at Friedrich-Loeffler Institute, Riems, Germany, on 21 Jun 2005 resulted positive. All 7 animals were slaughtered and cremated. Agriculture Minister Josef Proell said it was a standard safety procedure in Austria for cattle older than 24 months that die of unknown causes to be tested for BSE. As this cow died unexpectedly in late May after showing suspicious signs including tiredness, it was tested. Feeding animal meal to farm animals has been banned in Austria since 1991. If one carefully reads the Opinion of EU's Scientific Steering Committee on the GBR (Geographic Risk of BSE) in Austria, adopted on 16 May 2002, the occurrence of a 2nd case, particularly in a cow born prior to 2001, should not be overly surprising. According to the opinion, Austria was exposed to a very high external challenge from 1980-2000 due to import of large numbers of live cattle (about 190,000) and large amounts of MBM (meat and bone meat; 45 000 tons according to the country or 95,000 tons according to Eurostat and other export statistics) from BSE-risk countries. While significant fractions of these imports most likely did not enter the Austrian BSE/cattle system it was very likely that the BSE agent was imported into the country. Taken account of the information available on the origin and use made of the imported cattle and MBM it was concluded that the external challenge from cattle imports was high for 1986 to 1995 and very high for the period 1996-2000. On the other hand, MBM imports were posing a very high external challenge throughout the period 1980 to 2000. Though feed controls have been implemented since 1990, cross-contamination still appeared until 2001, there are at present still 2 EU member-countries with only one recorded BSE case: Greece and Finland. Luxembourg, like Austria, has had 2 cases
Denmark : 16 Danish-born BSE cases since 1987. 13 of the cases were diagnosed in Denmark (2000-1 (1.14 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 2001-6 (6.77 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 2002-3 (3.35 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 2003-2 (2.39 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 2004-1 (1.296 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 2005-Apr-22-0). 2 were diagnosed in Portugal and 1 was found in Italy. In 1992, there was one case in a cow imported from Scotland.
Sweden^ref : a 12 year old domestic cow at a farm in Vastmanland^ref in central Sweden showed signs of the illness on Mar 2, 2006 and tested positive on Mar 3^ref. Sweden has not recorded any case, and is the only EU country of which the GBR rating is II, namely that "It is unlikely that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent, but it cannot be excluded". All other EU countries have been rated as GBR III, namely "BSE has been confirmed, or it is likely but not confirmed that one or several domestic cattle are (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent". The 12-year-old beef cow of mixed Charolais breed was born on a farm of 50 cattle in Sweden. She was in late pregnancy, had shown difficulties in rising for approximately 2 weeks, did not respond to treatment, and was euthanized and sent to destruction to a rendering plant. Brain stem sampling was done in accordance with the EU legislation for BSE testing. The sample was positive in the rapid/screening test (Biorad TeSeE ELISA) with an OD value of 2,42 in the 1st testing, 2,76 and 2,88 in the 2nd testing of the same preparation and of 3,22 in the 3rd testing from a new brain homogenate (cut-off value for all the runs was 0,22). The confirmatory testing, conducted at SVA (National Veterinary Institute of Sweden), were Western immunoblotting (TeSeE Western Blot, Biorad) and immunohistochemistry employing F89/160.1.5 antibodies; both tests were positive. In the immunohistochemistry, 11 pieces of brain stem were analyzed; all of them showed diffuse granular positive immunostaining of the grey matter, including the BSE target brain areas. All TSE testing, including all the screening testing for Sweden, is conducted at SVA and is quality-certified. The current BSE-surveillance in Sweden involves testing of all fallen stock and all emergency slaughtered cattle above 24 months of age as well as a yearly random sample of 10,000 cattle above 30 months of age at normal slaughter. Between 2001 and 2005, > 170,000 cattle were tested; out of these, 46,700 were normal slaughter and 125,000 were fallen stock and emergency slaughter. All tested negative^ref. An epidemiological investigation on the possible source of infection is currently underway. Sweden has followed the European Union's legislation on feed banning. Since January 2001, there is a total ban on the use of mammalian protein in feed to food animals in order to avoid any possible cross contamination of the cattle feed at the feed mills.
Finland : 1 case since 1987 in 2001 (2.39 per million bovines aged over 24 months)
Italy : 125 cases since 1987 (48 in 2001 (14.1 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 38 in 2002 (10.60 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 29 in 2003 (9.86 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 8 in 2004 (2.348 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 3 at 22 Apr 2005; 67 autoctonous - expecially Holstein Friesian and Brown dairy cattle -, 6 imported) with average age of 5.7 years have been detected by screening 960,000 animals.
Croatia : a 5-year old cow tested positive on Feb 2006^ref
The Netherlands : 77 cases since 1987 (1.07 per million bovines aged over 24 months in 2000; 20 in 2001 (10.25 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 24 in 2002 (13.19 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 19 in 2003 (10.86 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 6 in 2004 (3.399 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 0 at 22 Apr 2005)
Poland : 20 cases since 1987 (4 in 2002 (1.28 per million bovines aged over 24 months); 5 in 2003 (1.49 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 11 in 2004 (3.578 per million bovines aged over 24 months), 11 at 22 Apr 2005)
North America :

USA : since the 1st case of mad cow disease turned up in December 2003 in Washington state, about 375 000 animals have been tested for the disease, primarily those that appear sick. The nation's cattle herd numbers 96 million.

1 affected Holstein cow originated from a dairy farm in Alberta, Canada was found in a farm in Mabton, about 40 miles southeast of Yakima in the State of Washington. Several nations, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, halted U.S. beef imports just hours after the USDA announced it on December 23, 2003. Japan is the largest overseas market for U.S. beef, but the logic of why Japan is banning beef is obscure since they already have cases of BSE. The USA had imported about 125 million pounds and about 1000 cattle from countries that later discovered BSE during the period when BSE would have been incubating. Current plans call for testing up to 400 000 animals over a period of 12 to 18 months for BSE : that's 10 times as many inspections as the department planned to conduct prior to the discovery of the infected cow on 23 Dec 2003. Some lawmakers on Capitol Hill, however, have suggested that as many as 3 to 4 million of the 35 million cattle slaughtered every year must be tested to assess the health of the nation's herds.
a 9 years old downer cow born before the August 1997 ban in Texas died in November 2004. Over 2004, the USDA has tested about 375 000 animals as part of an enhanced surveillance program and had found only 3 inconclusive results with ELISA. Those 3 were each further tested twice using the internationally recognized IHC method (2-3 days required to complete), and all came out negative. But the inspector general, an independent arm of the USDA, asked for an additional test because of some discrepancies in the initial findings. The office also asked USDA to use the Western blot method of testing (1-2 days to complete), which many scientists believe is more precise. The positive result was confirmed on Jun 10 2005 and that he held his 9 p.m.teleconference soon afterward. Another "experimental" test (probably an enhanced version of the "gold standard" test) was done that came up positive. It was unusual for a sample to test BSE-negative in one test and positive in another, but that it has happened in Europe. A sample of the animal's brain tissue was sent to the world reference laboratory for BSE in Weybridge, England, which using a combination of rapid, IHC and Western blot testing confirmed infection on 24 June : the animal's disease strain did not closely resemble the British-style strain found in the 1st mad cow, which was born in Canada and raised in Washington State. Instead, it was closer to a strain found in France -- a result, another scientist said, that suggested that the infection had come from a different pool of infected feed, possibly imported from France. At the same time these diagnostic tests were being run by Weybridge, USDA conducted its own additional tests. This is the 1st autocthonous US BSE diagnosis in some 388 000 samples tested. Japan, which used to buy more U.S. beef than any other nation ($1.4 billion annually), closed its market to American beef after the first mad cow case and has resisted strong pressure to reopen it. Japan, where more than 15 cows have tested positive for mad cow disease, now tests every cow slaughtered. Its government has asked U.S. producers to do the same, but the U.S. government has said the universal testing was not necessay. The Japanese government agreed in principle in October 2004 to resume beef imports from American cattle aged 20 months or younger, but insisted shipments would not resume until its independent commission declared U.S. beef was safe to eat. Current negotiations with South Korea center on beef from animals under 30 months. Scientists believe mad cow disease takes several years to incubate within an animal's nervous system, making young cattle far less risky. The USDA has also been trying to lift a U.S. ban on live Canadian cattle that was imposed after Canada's first BSE case in May 2003. The border was scheduled to reopen in March 2005, but a federal judge in Billings, Montana, ordered a temporary halt at the urging of beef ranchers and producers who argued the Canadian BSE-prevention system was inadequate. An appeal on that decision is scheduled for next month, and a full trial it scheduled for late in July 2005. Unfortunately the feed ban has not been uniformly enforced, so it will not be unexpected when the US has an animal affected with BSE born after the feed ban (BAB) was to have taken effect. Although feed manufacturers are complying with the rules, on-farm feed mixing appears to be under the radar screen of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) enforcement of the feeding ban. Although the feed ban rule was put into place by the FDA, it is the USDA that is charged with animal diseases and animal health. So when the feed ban is violated on a farm (for example, by on-farm feed mixing), FDA does not appear to have an enforcement arm; but as the disease has a long incubation, it is outside of the jurisdiction of the USDA. Again, it will not be surprising if the US has a BSE-affected animal that is born after the ban. Several errors occurred in the testing process in the USA: (1) The brain samples were frozen, which makes some tests harder. (2) Parts from 5 carcasses were temporarily mixed up. (3) No written records were kept. DNA tests showed that the cow was born and raised in a herd in Southeast Texas and was approximately 12 years old. It was sent to at 3D/4D Waco-based Champion Pet Foods plant in Texas and was selected for sampling on arrival. It sent a sample of the brain from the infected cow to a laboratory at Texas A&M University, where a test for BSE was inconclusive. The plant at which this animal was sampled is a 3D/4D pet food plant that does not handle animals for human consumption and, in this case, did not use the a